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If policymakers wish to reduce Canadian greenhouse gas emissions,
they can do so using a suite of policy tools that mitigate regional
impacts.
NO. 314, NOVEMBER 2010
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INNOVATIONIf Canada is serious about reducing greenhouse gases (GHGs), then governments must put
an economy-wide price on carbon dioxide and other GHG emissions. However,
policymakers have yet to take such action because of concerns about the economic cost of
GHG-reduction policies.
This Commentary shows that although policymakers do have reason to be concerned about
the economic effect of GHG-reduction policies, both regionally and nationally, they have
policy tools at their disposal to ameliorate the economic harm that taxing GHG emissions
can cause.
For example, because provincial economies are very different from one another, a price on
GHG emissions will affect them differently. If policymakers wanted to eliminate the inter-
regional transfers that therefore would result from climate policy, one solution would be to
return to the provinces the revenues collected through auctioned emissions permits, so that
the provinces may offer personal and corporate income tax relief.
In addition to the regional economic effect, policymakers may also be concerned about the
nationwide economic effect if Canada taxes emissions without the rest of the world also doing
so. Indeed, if Canada acted alone to reduce GHGs, it would reduce the economic
attractiveness of investing in Canada. However, reductions in personal and corporate income
taxes or rebates to firms proportional to their GHG emissions would mostly offset the cost of
reducing GHG emissions and would maintain the attractiveness of investing in Canada.
If a price on carbon emissions is to become a reality in Canada, a bargain must be struck that
achieves some degree of regional equity while also supporting economic growth.
Policymakers should carefully consider the regional impacts of climate policy as they pursue
Canada’s existing emissions reduction goals.
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E
fforts to reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions in
Canada are confronted by 
the significant difference in 
emissions intensity across the
country, especially the high 
emissions intensity of Alberta 
and Saskatchewan. 
While it is generally acknowledged that a
considerable amount of the country’s reductions
must occur in these two provinces, there is little
agreement on the allocation of costs between 
them and the rest of the country, or what this
might mean for economic performance in
different regions. 
Relatively few studies have assessed the regional
impacts of alternative climate policy approaches in
Canada.  Snodden and Wigle (2009) explored the
regional impacts of climate policies proposed
and/or implemented at the federal and provincial
levels of government.  This study focused on the
interactive effects of policies implemented in
different jurisdictions and concluded that a
nationally “fragmented” climate policy was likely
to be economically inefficient. Bataille et al.
(2009) produced a study for the Pembina Institute
and David Suzuki Foundation that analyzed the
level of effort required to reach two targets for
greenhouse gas emissions – the government of
Canada’s previous GHG target of a 20 percent
reduction from 2005 levels by 2020, and a target
that calls for a 25 percent reduction from 1990
levels by 2020.  That study was intended to
estimate the economic effects of achieving a
deeper GHG target than proposed by the federal
government, rather than to explore the
implications of different designs for climate policy.
However, some commentators expressed concerns
that the design selected for the analysis showed a
strong reduction in economic growth from
Alberta and Saskatchewan relative to the rest of
the country (Mintz 2009; Gibbons 2009).
This Commentary expands on the previous
studies by analyzing how climate policies can be
designed to achieve different regional outcomes.
It illustrates that government has significant
control over how the economic burden of climate
policies will be distributed among provinces.
Specifically, this Commentary analyzes three
simplified cap-and-trade policies that achieve the
same aggregate target for Canada’s greenhouse gas
emissions, but achieve drastically different regional
distributions of economic cost.  The first policy
involves intensity-based standards, with federal
regulations that cap the amount of emissions per
unit of output and allow emission permit trading
between emitters. In the second and third policies,
government auctions emissions permits and
allocates the revenues in the first instance via cuts
in federal corporate and personal income taxes
and in the second instance via transfers to
provincial governments to cut provincial corporate
and personal income taxes equal to the auction
revenue collected from each province. The study
further tests the sensitivity of the results to
assumptions about investment mobility in the
context of Canada enacting a climate policy that
roughly corresponds in timing with policies in
other countries.
Equity Definitions and Regional Impacts 
The concept of equity can be interpreted in
different ways when applied to distributing the
burden of environmental policies (Cazorla and
Toman 2000). The “polluter pays” approach
suggests that it is equitable to make polluters pay
the environmental harm caused by their polluting
activity, such as emitting GHGs. This approach is
similar to the “egalitarian” approach, where each
person has an equal right to a certain level of
emissions, meaning that those who emit more
should be regulated or pay more. Under these
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approaches, GHG-intensive regions would pay for
the damages caused by their emissions and/or pay
to reduce their emissions.
The “sovereignty” approach to equity suggests
that it is unfair to penalize regions for their current
GHG-intensity, since this is the result of
technology choices made prior to the global
community, or an individual country such as
Canada, deciding that GHG emissions are
undesirable. This approach is similar to the 
“equal cost” approach, which suggests that each
individual or region should bear similar costs for
reducing GHG emissions, even though some have
emitted more than others.
Finally, the “ability to pay” approach to equity
suggests that it is fair to ask wealthier individuals,
regions or countries to pay more to achieve a
collective good like reducing the risk of climate
change. In international climate change
negotiations, for example, developing countries
have argued that industrialized countries should
bear a greater share of the costs of GHG reduction,
partly because of their greater wealth. 
Since people tend to intertwine their self-interests
with their definitions of equity, it is no surprise –
both internationally and within Canada – that the
most vigorous and convinced proponents of each
definition of equity are 
often those who do best under that definition.
In Canada, regional interests differ in part
because of regional differences in GHG emissions
intensity (CO2 emissions per unit of GDP). 
The greenhouse gas intensities of Alberta and
Saskatchewan are greater than the rest of the
country (see Figure 1). Thus, the sovereignty 
and equal cost definitions of equity might be
associated with the interests of provinces with 
high GHG intensity, namely Alberta and
Saskatchewan, while the polluter pays and
egalitarian approaches might be associated with
provinces with low intensity. Finally, the results of
taking the ability to pay approach are ambiguous.
While Alberta and Saskatchewan have considerable
wealth, thanks in part to exploitation of fossil fuels,
other provinces, like Ontario and British 
Columbia, are also comparatively well off.
The challenge for achieving effective GHG
emissions reduction policy in Canada is to find a
political compromise between these conflicting
definitions of equity. This would be similar to what
Europe achieved in 1997 for allocating country
shares of emissions permits under the Kyoto
Protocol, which balanced sovereignty (historical
emissions) with ability to pay and polluter pays.
One might think that, as a single country, Canada
should find it easier than Europe to reach an
equitable arrangement for bearing the costs of
GHG reduction. But that has not been the case. In
fact, the issue has mostly been treated at a fairly
superficial level, in which divergent interests seem
to make little effort to find common ground.
Approach in this Study
In this study, we take no position as to which 
is the most equitable approach for allocating the
costs of GHG emissions abatement in Canada. Our
goal is to bring greater clarity to the discussion of
how different policy designs can lead to different
regional effects. The design that Canada eventually
settles on will be the outcome of negotiations that
achieve a trade-off between these different
definitions of equity and the interests they serve.
Our hope is that studies such as ours can ensure that
negotiations are not frustrated by confusion about
the regional impacts of different policy designs.
While policymakers have many options for
reducing GHG emissions, this study focuses on
two approaches for cap-and-trade policies that
achieve Canada’s new target for GHG emissions –
a 17 percent reduction from 2005 levels by 2020
(Environment Canada 2010).
1 While policy designs
may also include several complementary policy
measures (e.g., passenger vehicle emissions
standards), we exclude them from our analysis.
These approaches were selected because, if
implemented at the federal level, they would provide
a contrast in terms of regional impacts. The design
details of the approaches are described below.
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1. The first approach is based on the federal
government’s proposed, but not
implemented, Regulatory Framework for
Air Emissions (Government of Canada
2008).  Under the Regulatory Framework
for Air Emissions, carbon pricing is applied
using an intensity-based regulatory system,
where large emitters are required to reduce
their emission intensity by a specified
amount per year. Trading among
participants allows those with lower costs
of abatement to achieve greater reductions
and sell permits to those with higher costs.
As initially conceived, the federal policy
only applied to fossil-fuel based emissions
from large industrial facilities. In this
study, the policy is extended to GHG
emissions from all sectors. Furthermore,
parameters of the policy are set to ensure
the intensity-based system attains its
targeted 2020 emissions level.
2. The second approach employs an auction
of permits by the federal government and
the redistribution of auction revenue by
reducing corporate and personal income
taxes.  This method of revenue recycling is
based on British Columbia’s carbon tax,
which recycles approximately two thirds of
carbon revenue by reducing personal
income taxes and the remainder by
reducing corporate income taxes.  In our
analysis, we consider two variants of this























































































































































Figure 1: GHG Emissions per Gross Domestic Product in 2007
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approach: in one, revenue is used to
reduce federal corporate and personal
income taxes; in the second, the revenue
collected by the federal government from
each province is returned to that province,
where it is used to cut provincial
corporate and personal income taxes. The
latter variation ensures no net transfer of
revenue between provinces.
Because the second approach has two variants –
federal government uses permit auction revenue
to cut taxes and federal government transfers
auction revenue to provinces who cut taxes – we
actually test three scenarios in total. Scenario one
is the emissions intensity approach. Scenarios two
and three are the two tax cut approaches.
Our Model Explained 
The analysis in this paper relies on simulations
using a computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model of the Canadian economy.  Such models
are useful for this type of analysis because they
connect all major activities in the economy
(production, consumption, savings, investment,
trade, public finances) to show how the structure
and technological character of the economy
changes in response to policies (See Box 1).
In the model, Canada is treated as a small 
open economy, meaning that policies
implemented within Canada can affect domestic
prices for commodities, but that Canada is a price
taker on international export and import markets.
Consistent with the objective of this study, the
Canadian economy is disaggregated regionally, 
so that impacts of alternative policies on
individual regions within the country can be
discerned.  The model is further disaggregated 
by sector and commodity, with 21 sectors and 
18 commodities represented.  Trade in the model
occurs both between provinces and between
Canada and other countries.
3
C.D. Howe Institute
2 In each sector, a proportion of capital is treated as sector-specific fixed capital, with this amount determined based on a initial stock of capital depreciated over
the time period between the start of the policy (2010) and the reporting period (2020).  This formulation is known as ‘putty-clay’ capital.
3 Like many CGE models, this one applies the so-called Armington formulation for representing international trade, in which goods produced in different
regions are imperfect substitutes (Armington, 1969).
In our model, sectoral production is based on
constant returns to scale technologies represented by
nested constant elasticity of substitution functions.  In
resource extraction sectors, a sector-specific factor is
required in production, which is used to capture
resource payments (rents) and to calibrate the model
to an exogenously specified elasticity of supply.  The
nesting structure adopted is identical to that used in
the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis model
applied by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(Paltsev et al., 2005).
Economic output is divided between household
consumption, investment, net exports, and
government consumption.  Government
consumption is fixed in real terms.  The treatment of
investment and trade is described below.  Household
consumption is governed by a nested constant
elasticity of substitution function representing the
preferences of a representative consumer.  At the top
level of the nest, the household allocates its time
between leisure and work.  At the second and lower
levels, the household chooses between non-energy
commodities and between various energy
commodities. Because this study is not focused on
intertemporal or transitional dynamics, a static model
is used.  In this formulation, the rate of domestic
savings is treated as exogenous, and does not respond
to the policy.  The treatment of foreign savings is
discussed below.  The total capital stock available to be
used in production in each sector is endogenous,
however, since investors are able to allocate capital in
order to equalize rates of return between sectors.
2
In a CGE model, important assumptions are
required about model “closure” – how the model
reaches a new equilibrium in response to a policy.
These assumptions relate to whether or not
government balances its budget (and over what time
frame), the balance of trade with other countries and
between regions, movement of labour between
regions and countries, movement of investment
capital between regions and countries, and the balance
of leisure and work in the labour market. The closure
assumptions chosen for this study reflect its objective
of exploring regional distributional issues while
maintaining model simplicity. (For more on the
methodology see Appendix A.)
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In the model, introducing an emissions 
cap-and-trade system increases the cost of using
fuels and processes that produce GHG emissions
and leads to shifts in: (1) the way households
spend their income (i.e., usually favoring 
goods associated with fewer GHGs), (2) the
inputs firms use to produce goods (i.e., using less
GHG-intensive technologies and fuels), and (3)
the allocation of investment capital and labour to
different sectors of the economy to accommodate
the choices of firms and households. 
As described above, we assume the real
government budget is fixed, that domestic saving
is fixed, and households alter labour supply based
on the real wage rate. We also assume that the
labour market is free from rigidities, meaning that
there is no long-term involuntary unemployment.
We further assume labour is immobile
internationally and interprovincially, but that
workers can migrate between sectors in response
to wage differentials (thereby equalizing the 
wages between sectors within a region).  
Finally, we test two sets of assumptions
regarding international capital mobility. In a first
set of assumptions, we assume that net investment
by foreigners in Canada is external to our model,
meaning that policies in Canada can cause the
domestic rate of return on capital to deviate from
the international rate while the foreign investment
stays constant. Because this amount of foreign
investment in Canada is set externally to the
model, so too is the balance of trade. In a second
set of assumption, we assume that net foreign
investment in Canada adjusts internally in the
model so that the rate of return on capital is the
same in Canada as elsewhere. This means that
foreign investment can fall to reflect diminishing
investment opportunities in Canada, perhaps
because of domestic GHG-reducing policies that
increase the cost of business.
It should be clear that both of these
assumptions on capital mobility represent
extremes. Empirical evidence suggests that
investors do respond to differences between
domestic and international rates of return, but
with much less vigour than would be expected if
capital markets were frictionless. By modeling
extremes, we can assume that the response is 
likely to fall somewhere between. 
Our own view is that for this exercise, the
assumption that capital is not mobile
internationally is more appropriate.  Canada is
unlikely to implement a strong climate policy
unless other countries also do and, in this case, it
is unlikely that the combined policies will cause a
major shift of capital allocation between countries
(although a re-allocation between sectors – which
we model here – is more likely).
Results and Discussion
We model the growth of gross domestic product
for each region under the three policy scenarios
described above (Table 1 and Appendix Figure
A5).
4 Every region experiences a slight reduction
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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Table 1:  Annual Growth in GDP between 2010 and 2020 
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in economic growth as a result of the climate
policies, but the magnitude of the reduction
depends on policy design. 
￿ Policy scenario one – allocating permits based
on 
the emissions intensity of firms (intensity-
based cap-and-trade approach) – leads to
stronger growth in Alberta and Saskatchewan
relative 
to the rest of the country. Under this policy,
annual GDP growth in these two provinces is 
0.18 percent slower than in the absence of a
policy, while growth in the rest of Canada
slows by 
0.28 percent.
￿ Policy scenario two, in which the federal
government uses  the revenue from a permit
auction to reduce federal business and
personal income tax rates, has a greater impact
on the GDP growth rate for Alberta and
Saskatchewan than for the rest of the country.
￿ Policy scenario three, in which the federal
government returns the revenue from a permit
auction to provinces in proportion to their
contributions, via reductions in provincial
income taxes, yields an outcome in between
the other two policy designs. Alberta and
Saskatchewan end up with an economic
growth rate comparable to the average of the
rest of Canada (about 2.02 percent), which
would still mean that these two provinces had
given up more than others in terms of
retreating from their business-as-usual growth
rate.
Each of these policy senarios achieves the same
aggregate level of emissions, but allocates the
economic burden of achieving that target to
different regions.  The intensity-based scenario
goes beyond a sovereignty or equal cost definition
of equity because regions with low GHG intensity
actually see a greater reduction of their rate of
economic growth than Alberta and Saskatchewan.
In contrast, using the revenue from a permit
auction to reduce the federal business and
personal income tax rate yields an outcome closer
to an egalitarian or polluter pays definition of
equity.  These scenarios attain greater aggregate
economic output – the national economic growth
rate declines only by 0.17 percent in these policies
while the growth rate declines by 0.26 percent in
the intensity-based policy – but, as noted, at the
expense of greater reductions in output from
Alberta and Saskatchewan.
Each policy senarios has different economic
growth effects due to: (1) the level of inter-
regional financial transfers caused by the policy
(2) and the criteria by which permits are allocated
or the method by which the revenue from a
permit auction is redistributed (Table 2 and
Appendix Figure A6). Inter-regional financial
transfers support economic activity in the region
that receives the transfer.  In policies where
permits are auctioned and the revenue is used to
cut income taxes, this stimulates economic
activity, and dampens growth in the region that
supplies the transfer.  
In the scenario where auction revenue is used 
to cut federal business and personal income taxes,
Alberta and Saskatchewan transfer income to the
rest of Canada.  But no transfers occur when the
auction revenue is used to cut provincial income
taxes.
C.D. Howe Institute
Table 2: Financial  Transfers Leaving Region Under Different Policy Scenarios due to Policy as a 
Percent of GDP in 2020
Note: Positive numbers indicate a transfer from the region. No transfers occur when the auction revenue is used to cut provincial income taxes.
Source:  Authors’ calculations from GEEM (see appendix for details).
Intensity-based 
Cap-and-Trade System
Auction with Federal Business
and Personal Income Tax Cuts
Auction with Provincial Business and
Personal Income Tax Cuts
Alberta and Saskatchewan -1.0% 3.8% 0.0%
Rest of Canada 0.3% -0.9% 0.0%Commentary 314 | 7
The intensity-based cap-and-trade system, 
leads to a net transfer from the rest of Canada 
to Alberta and Saskatchewan, and shows the
strongest economic growth in these two provinces.
Alberta and Saskatchewan benefit from an
intensity-based policy because they have cheaper
options to reduce emissions intensity.  For
example, the electricity sector in Alberta and
Saskatchewan can increase generation from
renewable resources and natural gas, or adopt
carbon capture and storage when using coal, to
significantly reduce emissions intensity, while the
electricity sectors in other provinces already have
low emissions intensity (because of the large role
of non-emitting hydropower and nuclear power)
with fewer options for improvement. As a result,
even though all firms receive permits equal to
their emissions intensity targets, firms in Alberta
and Saskatchewan would face lower costs to
reduce emissions below their intensity targets and
thus would reduce emissions in order to generate
surplus permits to sell to firms in the rest of the
country.
Sensitivity to Assumptions 
about Capital Mobility
The results thus far are based on the assumption
that net foreign savings in Canada will not change
because of Canada’s climate policies.We now test
the alternative n which capital moves freely across
international boundaries such that there is a single
global return on capital.
5 Here, we treat Canada
as a small economy, meaning that policies
implemented domestically do not affect the global
return on capital. 
However, it turns out that the aggregate results
are not significantly changed by altering this
assumption.  Even when Canada imposes a carbon
policy while its trading partners do not, and when
international capital markets are frictionless,
growth rates are not significantly altered (Table 3).
Under the revised assumptions, the changes from
the assumption of no capital mobility are in
parentheses.
In each scenario, the rate of annual growth in
GDP declines by 0.02 percent or less, implying
that net capital flows are largely unaffected by the
policies. This small decline is mostly explained by
the type of policies we simulated, which provide
either direct or indirect subsidies to industry via
the free emissions associated with an intensity
target or the revenue provided by income tax cuts.
Cutting corporate income taxes improves the
after-tax return to investment, while the intensity-
based allocations in the cap-and-trade system
maintain robust returns to capital by indirectly
subsidizing industrial output.
6
However, the impact of capital mobility on
Canada’s GDP growth remains sensitive to 
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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matches the exogenously specified return on capital.
6 To disaggregate the effect of carbon costs from income tax cuts on net capital flows and GDP we would have to simulate an additional policy
where the rents from permits are not allocated to firms or households. However this is not possible in a CGE model as the rents from a permit
auction or free allocation must be allocated back into the economy somewhere, making the disaggregation difficult.
Table 3: Annual Growth in GDP between 2010 and 2020 under Perfect Capital Mobility
Source:  Authors’ calculations from GEEM (see appendix for details). 
Note: the changes from the assumption of no capital mobility are in parentheses.
Intensity-based Cap-and-
Trade System
Auction with Federal Personal
and Corporate Income Tax Cuts
Auction with Provincial Personal and
Corporate Income Tax Cuts
Alberta and Saskatchewan 2.10% (-0.02%) 1.87% (-0.01%) 1.99% (-0.02%)
Rest of Canada 1.86% (-0.02%) 2.05% (-0.01%) 1.99% (-0.02%)
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policy design. This analysis has explored two
specific policies that were designed to highlight 
differences in inter-regional equity. They do not
show significant differences in capital movement.
A comprehensive analysis of policy designs or the
effect of policies implemented in other countries
would show that some designs can lead to greater
capital movement. 
Final Comment
The purpose of this study is to present different
options for climate policy within the framework
of inter-regional equity. It shows that climate
policy can be designed to achieve either a polluter
pays/egalitarian approach or a sovereignty/equal
cost approach to equity. Climate policy resulting
in substantial GHG emissions reductions in
Canada need not lead to relatively slower growth
in GHG-intensive economies like Alberta and
Saskatchewan. Emissions permits can be
distributed, or the revenue from a permit auction
allocated, to achieve a large array of regional
outcomes. 
We have explored three policy scenarios under
two broad design approaches – the first which is
similar to the federal government’s 2008 proposal
for an intensity-based, cap-and-trade system and
the second which is based on an emissions 
cap-and-trade system with auctioned permits
returned to the economy via tax cuts (the same
approach British Columbia uses to redistribute the
revenue from its carbon tax). The former leads to
outcomes most consistent with a sovereignty or
equal cost approach to equity, while the latter is
more flexible and can achieve a polluter pays
approach or a compromise between the two
definitions. 
The compromise can be achieved by having 
the federal government return permit auction
(or carbon tax) revenues to provincial
governments in proportion to the contribution
they have made. This suggests, however, that the
permit-auction process may need to be operated
in a highly transparent manner by both provincial
and federal governments – no federal government
will want to be in a position of being solely
responsible for raising energy costs to Canadians
while provincial governments get the credit for
returning auction revenues via cuts in provincial
income taxes.
Finally, climate policy will not necessarily
reduce corporate profitability or lead to a net
outflow of investment capital from Canada.
Carbon pricing policies can be designed to
maintain corporate profitability by recycling
carbon revenue via tax cuts (especially corporate
income taxes) or by providing free allocations
based on industrial production. In this analysis,
neither of these policy scenarios results in a
significant net outflow of investment capital.  
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Appendix A - Description 
of GEEM model
The analysis employs a computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model called GEEM. The
GEEM model represents all economic activity
in the economy and ensures equilibrium in all
the markets (i.e., for commodities, services and
factors of production) by adjusting prices until
supply and demand reach an equilibrium. The
version of GEEM used for this analysis
represents British Columbia, Alberta,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and
Atlantic Canada, and each of these regions
interacts through trade of commodities and
services. Capital is assumed to be mobile among
regions, while labour is assumed to be mobile
within provinces or states. In the model, a
representative household in each region is the
owner of primary factors (labour, capital and
natural resources) which they rent to producers
who combine them with intermediate inputs to
create commodities. Commodities can be sold
to other producers (as intermediate inputs), to
final consumers, or to other regions and the rest
of the world as exports. Commodities can also
be imported from other regions or the rest of
the world. The key economic flows in GEEM
are captured schematically in Figure A1.
The version of GEEM in this analysis is 
static – it solves for a single period in 2020;
while the implicit time frame simulated in the
model is from 2010 to 2020.  Accordingly, in
each sector a proportion of capital is treated as
sector-specific fixed capital, with this amount
determined based on an initial stock of capital
depreciated over the time period between the
start of the policy (2010) and the reporting
period (2020).  Any forecasted additions to the
capital stock between 2010 and 2020 must be
from new or malleable capital. Malleable capital
is allocated to sectors until each sector offers the
same rate of return to capital – therefore climate
policy alters the allocation of capital among
sectors.  This formulation is known as ‘putty-
clay’ capital.
The data underlying the model is derived
primarily from the Statistics Canada System of
National Accounts. We use the S-Level Input,
Output, and Final Demand tables to populate
the model, and aggregate and disaggregate these
to focus on sectors of primary interest. One of
the challenges with the S-Level data is its lack of
disaggregation for energy and emissions
intensive sectors. We disaggregate these sectors
using the M- and L-Level data from Statistics
Canada, Statistics Canada’s Report on Energy
Supply and Demand, the Canadian Association
of Petroleum Producer’s production data for oil
and gas production, and the CIMS energy
economy model, among other sources.  
The following sections describe the
representation of industry, consumers and trade
between provinces and countries.  Additionally,
it discusses some of the key assumptions in
modeling policies in each scenario.
Industry
The GEEM model represents 21 industries 
(see Table A1).  The table also shows the data
from Statistics Canada’s input-output tables on
which the sectors are based.
All industrial sectors in the GEEM model are
represented by nested constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) functions, which represent
the technologies industry can use to produce
goods and services. Central to this function are
the elasticity-of-substitution parameters, which
represent how easily a sector can substitute
between different inputs while maintaining a
given level of production. For example, the
model simulates a tradeoff between energy
consumption and value added (i.e., capital and
labour) through the elasticity parameter labelled
vae in Figure A2. A low value for  vae indicates
that the value-added bundle is not very
substitutable for energy; and the energy
intensity of the sector is largely unaffected by
new economic conditions or policies. A high
value for  vae indicates greater substitution
possibilities; and economic conditions or
policies that raise the price for energy relative to
σ
σ σ
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the price for the value-added bundle induce
improvements in energy efficiency.
To model resource extraction sectors, we
introduce the concept of “resource rent,” which is
profit earned by resource sectors that exceeds a
normal rate of return on investment.  Resource
extraction sectors earn extra profits (some of which
is collected by government in the form of royalties)
because the resource they extract is scarce and
resource plays have different costs of extraction.  In
other words, unlike manufactured commodities
there is a finite amount resource to extract, such
that buyers pay a premium that reflects the scarcity
of the commodity.  In addition, resource plays
differ in their costs of extraction (quality), such
that owners of easy to extract (high quality)
resources earn additional profits relative to owners
of resources that are more difficult to extract. For
example, oil extraction from a conventional well
would yield greater resource rent per unit of oil
production than oil sands mining and upgrading
(which has higher costs of extraction).
We use the concept of resource rent to
characterize the supply curve for resources.  As
illustrated in Figure A2, we simulate the ability of
a resource sector to substitute between the amount
of a fixed resource and other inputs into
production, which is represented by the elasticity
value  rr.  If the price for the resource increases,
the value of the resource rent (extra profits) for a
given level of production increases.  Assuming the
price for other inputs into production stays
constant, the model will simulate an increase in
production by shifting away from the fixed
resource towards greater inputs.  This reflects
industry moving towards more marginal resources.
In an alternative scenario where the costs of
extraction increase (due to the adoption of carbon
capture and storage for example), the cost of
inputs becomes more costly in comparison to the
resource and the model simulates that the
marginal resources will not be developed.
The values for all elasticity values used to
parameterize the model are illustrated in Table A2.
An additional feature of the GEEM model is we
include “alternative” methods of producing goods
and services from sectors with specific abatement
technologies (e.g., carbon capture and storage).
These technologies are unprofitable in the
reference case and only become active under
certain economic or policy conditions (e.g., carbon
pricing).  Table A3 shows the key sectors and
processes in which carbon capture and storage is
available.
In the GEEM model, all industries maximize
profits (i.e., revenue minus costs of production)
subject to technology constraints.  The projected
growth rates for each industrial sector are based on
projections provided to the authors by
Informetrica.
Consumers
GEEM uses a representative agent framework,
where all households are represented by a single
representative agent.  In this framework, the
representative agent maximizes his/her welfare,
where welfare is a function of consumption of
various commodities and leisure (see Figure A3 
for the tree structure and Table A4 for the
associated elasticity values).  Note that the trees
representing space heating, appliances and other
goods are identical to the tree representing
transportation, and therefore are not shown.  Most
of the elasticity values have been econometrically
estimated from the CIMS energy-economy model,
while the values representing the substitutability
between an end-use and other goods ( transit) are
from Paltsev (2005).
Trade
The substitutability between domestically 
produced and imported goods is represented 
by an Armington formulation (see Figure A4 
for the structure of imports and Table A5 for 
the corresponding elasticity values).  An elasticity 
of infinity indicates that a commodity is
homogeneous and Canada is a price taker.  
This is important to represent crude oil in
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Exports used to buy 
International Imports
Figure A1: Overall structure of the GEEM model
Source:  Authors’ calculations.Commentary 314 | 13
PEXT Crop and animal production
Forestry and logging
Fishing, hunting and trapping
Support activities for agriculture and forestry
Crop and animal production
Forestry and logging
Fishing, hunting and trapping
Support activities for agriculture and forestry
OSMU Oil Sands Upgraded Mining and oil and gas extraction
OSIS Oil Sands In-situ
OCLM Oil Light Medium
OCHY Oil Heavy
CNGAS Conventional Natural Gas Extraction
TNGAS Tight Natural Gas Extraction
SNGAS Shale Natural Gas Extraction
MINING Coal and Mineral Mining
Support activities for mining and oil and gas extraction
CELEC Conventional electric power generation Utilities
RELEC Hydroelectric and other renewable electric power generation
PAPER Paper manufacturing Manufacturing
REFINE Petroleum and coal products manufacturing
CHEM Chemical manufacturing
INDMIN Non-metallic mineral product manufacturing
METAL Primary metal manufacturing
OMAN Miscellaneous  manufacturing






GOVT Government sector Government sector




Information and cultural industries
Finance, insurance, real estate and rental and leasing
Professional, scientific and technical services
Administrative and support, waste management and 
remediation services
Educational services
Health care and social assistance
Arts, entertainment and recreation
Accommodation and food services
Other services (except public administration)
Operating, office, cafeteria, and laboratory supplies
Travel and entertainment, advertising and promotion





Information and cultural industries
Finance, insurance, real estate and rental and leasing
Professional, scientific and technical services
Administrative and support, waste management and
remediation services
Educational services
Health care and social assistance
Arts, entertainment and recreation
Accommodation and food services
Other services (except public administration)
Operating, office, cafeteria, and laboratory supplies
Travel and entertainment, advertising and promotion
Non-profit institutions serving households
Table A1:  Industries in GEEM
Source: Authors’ calculations from GEEM (see appendix for details).
GEEM Sector GEEM Sector Description Data Available at the S-LevelC.D. Howe Institute
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Sector Output















Figure A2: Structure of industrial sectors in GEEM
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Table A2: Elasticities of Substitution by Sector
Source: CIMS, 2009 and Paltsev, 2005.
rr σ ii σ vae σ va σ e σ fe σ lqd σ
PEXT 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.55 1.08 0 1.17
OSMU 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.55 0.2 0.3 1.01
OSIS 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.55 0.2 0.3 1.01
OCLM 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.55 0.2 0.3 1.01
OCHY 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.55 0.2 0.3 1.01
CNGAS 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.55 0.2 0.3 1.01
TNGAS 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.55 0.2 0.3 1.01
SNGAS 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.55 0.2 0.3 1.01
MINING 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.55 0.2 0.3 1.01
CELEC 0 0.2 0.45 0.55 0.4 1 0.1
RELEC 0.6 0.2 0 0.55 0 0 0
PAPER 0 0.2 0.26 0.55 0.2 0.3 1.2
REFINE 0 0.2 0.26 0.55 0.2 0.3 1.2
CHEM 0 0.2 0.26 0.55 0.2 0.3 1.2
INDMIN 0 0.2 0.26 0.55 0.2 0.3 1.2
METAL 0 0.2 0.26 0.55 0.2 0.3 1.2
OMAN 0 0.2 0.45 1.1 0.4 0.8 1.2
TRANSIT 0 0.2 0.27 1.1 0.49 0.8 1
TRANS 0 0.2 0.27 1.1 0.49 0.8 1
SERV 0 0.2 0.35 1.1 0.2 0.5 1
GOVT 0 0.2 0.35 1.1 0.2 0.5 2.5Commentary 314 | 15
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Table A3: Sector and Processes which Include a CCS option
Source: Authors’ calculations from GEEM (see appendix for details).
Sector Process
Oil Sands Mining and Upgrading Hydrogen production
Heat production
Oil Sands In-situ Heat production
Natural Gas Processing Formation CO2 removal
Heat production




Non-metallic Minerals Kiln operations


































Figure A3: Structure of Household Welfare
Source:  Authors’ calculations.| 16 Commentary 314
cl transit hke he lqd
Space Heating
0.6
0 3.3 3.5 3.4
Transportation 0.2 0.6 7.5 0
Appliances 0 0.1 0 0
Other Goods 0.25 0 0 0
Table A4: Elasticities of substitution for households
Source: CIMS, 2009 and Paltsev, 2005.











Figure A4: Structure of Imports
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
na σ fr σ
Crude Oil
Natural Gas 4.0
Other Energy 4.0 4.0
Other Goods 2.5 2.5
Table A5: Armington Elasticities
∞ ∞
∞
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
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Figure A5: Annual Growth in GDP , between 2010 and 2020









Auction with Federal Business
and Personal Income Tax Cuts
Auction with Provincial Business
and Personal Income Tax Cuts




























































Figure A6: Financial Transfers Leaving Regions Under Different Policy Scenarios 
Note:  Positive numbers indicate a transfer from the region. No transfers occur when the auction revenue is used to cut provincial income taxes.
Source:  Authors’ calculations from GEEM (see appendix for details).| 18 Commentary 314
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